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MARRIAGE AND OTHER DOMESTIC
RELATIONSHIPS:
COMPARATIVE AND CRITICAL EQUALITY
ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES IN FORM AND
SUBSTANCE
LYNN D. WARDLE1
INTRODUCTION: THE PERFECT STORM
The controversy and debate concerning proposals and law reforms to
legalize same-sex marriage lie at the center of the confluence of numerous
currents and counter-currents regarding marriage and other intimate
domestic relationships. These include debates over formal-versus-informal
domestic relationships; public-versus-private ordering of domestic
relationships; legal-versus-extra-legal recognition of domestic
relationships; benefits-versus-status; dual-gender-versus-gender-neutral
relationships; prohibited-or-tolerated-or- preferred relationships; etc..
These subjects involve not only dyadic positions, but also many varied
possibilities along a spectrum between polar positions. These clashing
crosscurrents are only the most recent ones. There are numerous
controversies regarding marriage and domestic relationships of the past-
both resolved and unresolved. Such long-debated, yet still- ongoing
marriage policy issues concern permanent-versus-transitory/terminable
relationships (including permissive-versus-restrictive dissolution, fault-
I Bruce C. Hafen Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. This
article is based in part on presentations made at the Symposium on Legal, Secular, and Religious
Perspectives on Marriage Equality/Marriage Protection/Same-Sex Marriage, hosted by the Journal of
Civil Rights and Economic Development, November 12, 2010 at St. John's University School of Law,
and at the American University Washington College of Law 2009 Founders' Day Celebration
Symposium on Valuing All Families Under Law, January 26, 2009, in Washington, D.C., and Lynn D.
Wardle, Gender Neutrality and the Jurisprudence of Marriage, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MARRIAGE
AND OTHER INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 37 (Scott FitzGibbon, Lynn D. Wardle, & A. Scott Loveless
eds., 2010). The valuable research assistance of Elizabeth N. Hamish, Christine Christensen, Nephi
Hardman, Curtis Thomas and Robert Selfaison is gratefully acknowledged.
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versus-no-fault divorce, and unilateral-versus-mutually-agreed
termination), generative-versus-consumer relationships, and hedonistic-
versus-altruistic relationships.
Looking into the past more deeply and across cultures more broadly we
see similar conflicts that have been largely settled in western societies but
that still are being debated in other societies. These conflicts include
polygamy-versus-monogamy, endogamy-versus-exogamy, age-restricted-
versus-age-unlimited, and mutual-consensual-versus-non-consensual. The
numerous crosscurrents now clashing have produced a "perfect storm" of
controversy about the legal recognition and regulation of marriage and
other domestic relationships; same-sex marriage is at the vortex.
Controversies about marriage and other domestic relationships are
neither unprecedented nor insignificant. How some have been resolved in
the past has had profound consequences for men, women, and children as
well as for societies' stability, infrastructure, and social capital. Some
changes, such as the trend toward monogamy, would be identified as
having had very positive effects, while other changes, such as the adoption
of "unilateral" no-fault divorce in many states, have had more debatable
impacts, including unexpectedly detrimental consequences for children,
families and society in general. 2 And so it will be with the current law
reform proposals: they will profoundly impact the welfare of families,
children, and of our entire society "for better or for worse."
For example, the last two decades have seen an explosion of
commentary and proposals that all adult relationships of intimacy should
receive the same legal treatment. The proposals have been for legally
equalizing marriage and non-marital relationships. 3 For example, in 2000,
capping nearly a decade of study and four successive drafts, the American
Law Institute formally adopted Principles of the Law of Family
2 See, e.g., W. Bradford Wilcox, The Evolution of Divorce, NATIONAL AFFAIRS, Fall 2009, at 81,
available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-evolution-of-divorce; LINDA J.
WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER,
HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY (Doubleday 2000); JUDITH WALLERSTEIN, JULIA LEWIS &
SANDRA BLAKESLY, THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE (Hyperion 2000); BARBARA DAFOE
WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE (Knopf 1996).
3 For example, Nancy Polikoffs 2008 book Beyond (Straight and Gay) Marriage, is subtitled
"Valuing All Families under the Law," and that subtitle succinctly summarizes the main theme of her
book. She asserts both equality and beneficence arguments. She writes, "I propose family law reform
that would recognize all families' worth." NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY)
MARRIAGE (Beacon Press 2008) (hereinafter "POLIKOFF"). Her benefits claim is that "[c]ouples should
have the choice to marry based on spiritual, cultural or religious meaning of marriage in their lives; they
should never have to marry to reap specific and unique legal benefits." Id. (emphasis in original).
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Dissolution, which was published in a bound volume two years later.4
Chapter 6 of the Principles proposes that non-marital couples be given the
same financial claims and interests upon breakup as married couples.
Additionally, Chapter 3 proposes equivalent-to-traditional (biological,
marital. and adoptive) legal recognition with equivalent legal benefits for
de facto parenthood and parenthood by estoppel and legal parental status
(rights and benefits) for non-biological (and non-adoptive) parents who
have assumed some form of quasi-parental relationship with a child. Both
proposals (and many other recommendations in Principles) went far
beyond the existing law or trend of law in most states.5
About the same time, similar proposals were being made in Canada. In
December 2001, following two years of research and meetings, the Law
Commission of Canada issued a report entitled Beyond Conjugality:
Recognizing and Supporting Close Personal Adult Relationships.6 The
Report recommended significant revision of Canadian laws regulating
personal relationships, including enactment of new laws allowing virtually
all adult conjugal and non-conjugal couples to register their relationships,
creating legal status with legally enforceable commitments, including
"caring arrangements, consent to treatment, support, and property sharing,"
with "opt-out provisions."7 It also recommended legalization of same-sex
marriage. 8
These proposals and recommendations have not been without some legal
impact. For instance, within eighteen months after the publication of
Beyond Conjugality in Canada, courts in three provinces had ruled that
4 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (ALI), PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (LexisNexis 2002) (hereinafter "Principles"). See generally David Westfall,
Unprincipled Family Dissolution: The AL1's Recommendations for Division of Property, in
RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 176 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) (hereinafter "RECONCEIVING").
5 See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Undeserved Trust: Reflections on the ALI's Treatment ofDe Facto
Parents, in RECONCEIVING, supra note 4, at 90; Margaret F. Brinig, Domestic Partnership and Default
Rules, in RECONCEIVING, supra note 4, at 269; Marsha Garrison, Marriage Mattters: What's Wrong
with the ALI's Domestic Partnership Proposal, in RECONCEIVING, supra note 4, at 305; Lynn D.
Wardle, Beyond Fault and No-Fault in the Reform of Marital Dissolution Law, in RECONCEIVING,
supra note 4, at 9.
6 LAW COMM'N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE
PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS (2001), available at
http://www.samesexmarriage.ca/docs/beyond-conjugality.pdf (hereinafter "Beyond Conjugality").
7 Susan Price-Livingston, Law Commission of Canada Report: Beyond Conjugality, OLR
RESEARCH REPORT (Feb. 4, 2002), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2002/olrdata/jud/rpt/2002-R-
0172.htm (citing Beyond Conjugality, supra note 6, at 113-22, Recommendations 31-32).
8 Id (citing Beyond Conjugality at 122-31, Recommendation 33).
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same-sex marriage should be legalized, 9 and within four years the
Canadian Parliament had enacted legislation to legalize same-sex marriage
throughout the country.10 By contrast, the impact of the ALI Principles in
the United States has been largely academic, insignificant, and marginal.
Indeed, in the first eight years since adoption of the final version of the ALI
Principles, very few states, primarily in New England states, have followed
the Principles. The main impact of the Principles has been as an obligatory
footnote citation in a string cite in some state court family law cases. That
is, it is acknowledged to show that the court was aware of contemporary
academic proposals and commentary."I When the ALI Principles are cited,
"[a]lmost half of .. . the Principles recommendations are rejected more
often than accepted by a ratio of 1.5 to 1."l2
Many legal commentators have added to this literature. In a recent book,
Professor Nancy Polikoff asserts that "[m]arriage as a family form is not
more important or valuable than other forms of family, so the law should
not give it more value."' 3 Professor Polikoff includes relationships of more
than just two persons in the alternative non-marital intimate relationships
that she argues should be treated the same as marriages in the law. She
argues, "'Couples, meaning two people with a commitment grounded on a
sexual affiliation, should not be the only unit that counts as family."' 4 She
argues that there have been many recent developments to "knock[ing]
marriage off its perch,"' 5 citing, inter alia, the ALI Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution, which she considers an intellectual victory for the
equal-value claim and movements. 16 She also argues that "distinctions
between married couples and everyone else [remain in the law] without
9 See Halpern v. Canada [2003] 65 O.R. 3d 161 (Can. Ont. Ct. App.); Hendricks v. Quebec [2002]
R.J.Q. 2506 (Can. Que. Sup. Ct.); and Barbeau v. British Columbia [2003] B.C.C.A. 251 (Can. B.C. Ct.
App.).
10 Civil Marriage Act, Bill C-38, passed by the House of Commons on June 28, 2005, by the
Senate on July 19, 2005, and it received Royal Assent on July 20, 2005.
11 Michael R. Clisham & Robin Fretwell Wilson, The American Law Institute's Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution, Eight Years After Adoption: Guiding Principles or Obligatory Footnote?,
42 FAM. L.Q. 573, 575-76 (2008) ("A paltry 100 cases have cited to the Principles [in the nearly
eighteen years] since the beginning of the project in 1990. .. . [B]y far and away, the Principles are
most frequently used to 'pile on'-that is, to bolster the court's holding in a case that would have come
out the same way in the absence of the Principles. Thus, in nearly a quarter of cases (24.24%), the
Principles serve as an obligatory footnote. Like Judge Robert Sack's quip about law review articles,
judges frequently use the Principles 'like drunks use lampposts, more for support than for
illumination."').
12 Id
13 POLIKOFF, supra note 3, at 3.
14 Id. at 4.
15 Id. at 90.
16 Id. at 87.
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assessing the justness of that approach. It's time we make that
assessment."1 7 All laws that "affect families need to be evaluated in light of
contemporary realities."' 8 Using marriage to selectively distribute benefits
utilizes an incorrect dividing line because these laws no longer "serve their
original purpose, which was tied to legally mandated sexuals in
marriage."' 9 She argues that the law should allow all people who wish to
declare that their relationship is a family relationship to register,20 and
proposes a "valuing-all-families legal system [that] keeps marriage and
extends it to same-sex couples although with a new official name-civil
partnership." 21
These relational equivalence claims raise many profound issues of fact
and value: Are all relationships equal to marriage? Would "leveling" all
adult intimate relationships be beneficial for individuals, families, and
society, or would it produce side effects that would cause more harm than
good? Those are the questions this article examines.
Part I begins by summarizing the status of legal recognition for same-sex
relationships in the world today. It also reviews the status of other
domestic relationships (as of 2010). Then it explains that legal recognition
of adult domestic relationships (both heterosexual and same-sex) in the
United States and in other nations has taken four different forms. The
differences between them are of form, substance, and operational temporal
perspective. This shows that the global trend and the overwhelming
grassroots trend in the United States is to preserve the unique legal status
for marriage as the union of man and woman. The extension of marriage-
equivalent benefits under a new, or another, status is controversial.
Registration and extension of specific benefits is also controversial for
different reasons. Informal status with informal (often non-legal) or
retroactive conferral of benefits is also possible, but potentially problematic
as well.
Part II distinguishes two categories of marriage incidents and benefits
that may help in evaluating the claims of particular legal benefits for
particular relationships. It considers the "equivalent-benefits" claim,
noting that marital status and marital benefits are distinguishable and that
17 Id. at 8.
18 POLIKOFF, supra note 3, at 9.
19 Id. at 19.
20 Id. at 131. The purpose of some marriage benefit laws is to give maximum autonomy to certain
individuals. Marriage is not the sole criteria for that, nor is it a substitute for dependency.
21 Id. at 132.
2012] 667
JOURNALOFCIVILRIGH7S & ECONOMFCDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 26:3
true "marital incidents" benefits should be distinguished from "marriage
benefits of convenience." While this article concludes that it would be
unwise to extend true "marital incident" benefits to non-marital couples, it
also suggests some marriage benefits rooted in administrative convenience
could appropriately be extended to some non-marital couples. It discusses
the relevance of the distinction between legal protection for foundational
social relations and institutions and the real limits of positivist theory to
construction equivalence.
Part III addresses the "equality of relationships" argument and discusses
whether (and if so, when and why) legal distinctions between various forms
of domestic relationships are justified, particularly the strong wall that
separates marriage from same-sex and other relationships. It will suggest
that protection of the institution of conjugal marriage is essential to protect
adults, children, families, and all of society. It considers the claim that all
(or all relevant) adult intimate relationships should be treated the same in
terms of legal status and effects. It critically examines and responds to the
"equal-value" claim, reviewing some of the evidence that form matters in
intimate relations; that conjugal marriage provides the safest, most
beneficial environment in which to raise children; and that heterosexual
cohabitation is significantly less beneficial for adults, children, and society
than conjugal marriage. This section of the article also considers the dual-
gender requirement for marriage and discusses the centrality of gender
integration to the purposes and functions of the institution of marriage.
The conclusion reiterates the importance of preserving and protecting
marriage as the union of a man and a woman as a unique legal status with
some unique legal benefits-for the sake of society and families, and
especially for the sake of children. It concludes that conferring marriage
upon other kinds of relationships, giving equivalent domestic relationships
status and benefits to all relationships, and giving all of the benefits of
marriage (including what are called herein marital incident benefits as well
as what are labeled administrative convenience benefits) to those
alternative relationships, would fail to achieve most of the social purposes
that underlie marriage, as well as the personal purposes that people have for
entering into alternative forms of adult intimate relationships. It would be
like trying to force the proverbial round block into the proverbial square
hole. It would result in a mere marriage of convenience that might achieve
some temporary and illusory success but in the long run would be- for the
individuals in those relationships, for the institution of marriage, and for
society-a tragedy of disastrous proportions. It would destroy marriage,
for if everything is marriage, nothing is marriage, and marriage means
668
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nothing.
I. THE STATUS OF MARRIAGE AND OTHER DOMESTIC RELATIONSHIPS IN
THE LAW
A. Same-Sex Marriage and Equivalent Civil Unions
1. Same-Sex Unions Have Marriage-Like Status in Few Jurisdictions
In this nation there has been a strong movement to legalize same-sex
relationships as marriage or marriage-equivalent. As Appendix Al shows,
since 2004, same-sex marriage has been legalized in six of the fifty United
States of America, as well as in the District of Columbia. 22 Also, same-sex
unions equivalent to marriage have been created in ten other US states. 23
Additionally, three other states now allow some form of same-sex
partnership registration with some selected benefits, less than the total
bundle of benefits extended to marriage and civil unions, as noted in
Appendix 11.24 While informal marriage (common law marriage of male-
female couples) is allowed today in only ten states and the District of
Columbia,25 no case in any state has held that same-sex couples can have
common law marriage, and at least one professor suggests that it is not
permitted anywhere (though that may be debatable). 26
22 See infra App. I. Additionally, California legalized same-sex marriage by judicial decree briefly
in 2008, but the voters quickly overturned that by passing Proposition 8 in November 2008. Lower-
court rulings by state courts in Hawaii and Alaska also legalized or ruled in favor of same-sex marriage,
but before those rulings became effective, voters in each state adopted amendments to the state
constitutions to prohibit same-sex marriage. See Charles M. Cannizzaro, Marriage in California: Is the
Federal Lawsuit Against Proposition 8 About Applying the Fourteenth Amendment or Preserving
Federalism, 38 PEPP. L. REv. 161, 162-66 (2010).
23 The term "civil unions" is an inexact term, not a term of art. It is generally used (and used
herein) to refer to formal same-sex legal relationships that enjoy all, or substantially all, of the benefits,
privileges, and duties of marriage. However, the same such relationships are denominated "domestic
partnerships" in some states, including California and Nevada. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West
2005); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 122A.010-122A.510 (2009). By the same token, formally-created and
legally-recognized same-sex legal relationships that are afforded less than identical, or substantially-
identical, legal rights, duties and benefits are generally called "domestic partnerships," but could just as
well be called "civil unions." See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Counting the Costs of Civil Unions: Some
Potential Detrimental Effects on Family Law, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 401 (2002).
24 See infra App. I.
25 The American jurisdictions that permit common law marriage are Alabama, Colorado, the
District of Columbia, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and
Utah. Thomas P. Gallanis, The Flexible Family in Three Dimensions, 28 LAw & INEQ. 291, 293 (2010).
26 Only two jurisdictions of the ten states (plus the District of Columbia) that allow common law
marriage also allow same-sex marriage. Those two jurisdictions are Iowa and The District of Columbia.
In D.C., since legalization of same-sex marriage was accomplished by enactment of positive law (an
2012] 669
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Globally, as the Appendices show, same-sex marriage has been legalized
in only ten of 193 sovereign nations and that has occurred within the past
dozen years.27 Also, same-sex unions equivalent to marriage have been
created in seventeen other nations. Same-sex registrations with limited
benefits are provided in six identified nations. 28 We have gone from no
nations with legal same-sex marriage in 2000, to ten nations with same-sex
marriage in 2012, and from three nations with marriage-equivalent civil
partnerships in 1995 to seventeen such nations in 2012, plus another half-
dozen nations with specific benefits. In summary, just one-sixth of
sovereign nations give any significant formal legal status or marital
benefits to same-sex couples, and only fourteen percent (14%) of sovereign
nations provide those couples access to marriage or marriage-equivalent
status or rights. Eighty-three percent (83%) of the nations in the world give
no legal relationship status or benefits to same-sex couples.
2. Same-Sex Unions Lack Marriage-Like Status in Most Jurisdictions
On the other hand, the "backlash" grassroots movement rejecting same-
sex marriage turns out to be much more substantial in America than
internationally. In the past decade, as the Appendices document, thirty-one
(31) states (that is sixty-two percent of all American states) have passed
state constitutional amendments defining marriage as the union of husband
and wife, 29 including twenty state constitutional amendments that also
prohibit creation of marriage-equivalent same-sex civil unions, however
labeled. 30 At least forty-one states have passed their own "defense of
ordinance), there is no implication that common-law marriage also has changed to include same-sex
couples. In Iowa, same-sex marriage was legalized by judicial decree. Vamum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d
862, 907 (Iowa 2009). University of Iowa Law Professor Gallanis suggests that common-law marriage
applies "only to opposite-sex couples." Gallanis, supra note 25, at 293. However, the reason why the
logic and rationale in the Iowa Supreme Court decision legalizing same-sex formal marriage would not
apply to common-law marriages as well is not self-evident or immediately apparent.
27 See infra App. I.
28 See infra App. H.
29 ALA. CONST., amend. 774; ALASKA CONST., art. I, §. 25; ARIZ. CONST., art. 30, § 1 (Prop. 102);
ARK. CONST., amend. 83; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (Prop. 8); COLO. CONST., art. II, § 31; FLA. CONST.
art. 1, § 27 (Amend. 2); GA. CONST., art I, § 4, para. 1; IDAHO CONST., art. III, § 28; KAN. CONST. art.
XV, § 16; Ky. CONST., § 233A; LA. CONST., art. XII, § 15; MICH. CONST., art. I, § 25; MIss. CONST., §
263-A; Mo. CONST., art. I, § 33; MONT. CONST., art. XIII, § 7; NEB. CONST., art. I, § 29; NEV. CONST.,
art. I, § 21; N.D. CONST., art. XI, § 28; OHIO CONST., art. XV, § 11; OKLA. CONST., art. II, § 35; OR.
CONST., art. XV, § 5a; S.C. CONST., art. XVII, sec. XV; S.D. CONST., XXI, § 9; TENN. CONST., art. XI,
§ 18; TEx. CONST., art. I, § 32; UTAH CONST., art. I, § 29; VA. CONST., art. I, § 15-A; WIS. CONST., art.
Xffl, § 13.
30 See infra Apps. I, II.
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marriage" policies by statute, constitutional amendment, or both. Such
defense of marriage policies effectively prohibit courts in those states from
recognizing same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions and also
express strong public policy in the states barring same-sex marriage
recognition. 31 Two-thirds of American states (thirty-four states) clearly
reject and prohibit either marriage or any marriage-like legal status or
marital benefits for same-sex couples. 32 Forty-four American states now
recognize marriage as the union between a man and a woman only.
Internationally, the legal rejection of same-sex marriage is the dominant
and growing rule of law. Forty-seven nations-twenty-four percent (24%)
of the 193 sovereign nations recognized by the United Nations-have
constitutional provisions that expressly define or by gendered terms clearly
refer to marriage as a conjugal union of a man and a woman. 33 All but one
of these constitutional provisions has been adopted since 1970!34 By
contrast, no national constitution expressly protects or requires same-sex
marriage.35 Additionally, same-sex marriage is prohibited either by statute,
31 This includes the 30 marriage amendment states (see App. I, infra) plus the following 15 states
which have adopted statutory marriage recognition acts but no constitutional provision. ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-101; CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5; DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 13, § 101; FLA. STAT. ANN. §
741.212; HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-3 (1999); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/212; IND. CODE § 31-11- 1-
1; IA. ST. 595.2 (2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 19-A, § 701; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01; N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 457:1 To 3; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2; PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. § 1704; WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.04.020; W. VA. CODE § 48-2-603 (2002).
32 See Lynn D. Wardle, A Response to the "Conservative Case "for Same-Sex Marriage. Same-
Sex Marriage and "the Tragedy of the Commons," 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 441 (2008).
33 See The Constitutions of THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA, 1995, art. 32; THE REPUBLIC OF
AZERBAIJAN, Nov. 12, 1995, art. 34; THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS, art. 32; THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC
OF BRAZIL, 1988, art. 226; THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA, July 13, 1991, art. 46; BURKINA FASO, 1991,
art. 23; THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA, Sept. 21, 1993, art. 45; THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
1982, art. 49; COLOMBIA, 1991, art. 42; THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, 1976, art. 36; THE REPUBLIC OF
ECUADOR, art. 38; ERITREA, art. 22; THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, Aug. 1995,
art. 34; THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA, art. 27; THE REPUBLIC OF HONDURAS, 1982, art. 112;
JAPAN, 1947, art. 24; THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA, Feb. 15, 1922, art. 110; THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA,
Oct. 25, 1992, art. 38; THE REPUBLIC OF MALAWI, art. 22; THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA, July 29, 1994,
art. 48; THE REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO, art. 71; THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA, 1990, art. 14; THE
REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA, Nov. 19, 1986, art. 72; THE REPUBLIC OF PARAGUAY, June 20, 1992, arts.
49,50, 51,52; THE REPUBLIC OF PERU, 1993, art. 5; THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, Apr. 2, 1997, art. 18;
THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA, art. 62; THE REPUBLIC OF SURINAME, 1987, art. 35; THE KINGDOM OF
SWAZILAND, 2005, art. 27; THE REPUBLIC OF TA.IKISTAN, Nov. 6, 1994, art. 33; TURKMENISTAN, art.
25; THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, 1995, art. 31; UKRAINE, June 28, 1996, art. 51; THE BOLIVARIAN
REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA, 1999 art. 77; THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, Apr. 18, 1992, art. 64.
34 The Constitution of Japan, which was adopted in 1947, is the only such constitution adopted
after 1970 that limits marriage to male-female couples.
35 However, by creative judicial interpretation of equality provisions, not marriage provisions,
courts in Canada and South Africa have distilled a requirement for legal recognition of same-sex
marriage. See Harrison v. Canada, [2005] 290 N.B.R.2d 70 (Can.); Minister of Foreign Affairs v. Fourie
2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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common law, or binding legal custom in all nations that do not explicitly
forbid or allow same-sex marriage in their constitutions.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes that "[t]he
family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled
to protection by society and the State." 36 Similar statements about the
foundational importance and specially-protected role of families are found
in dozens of other international conventions, compacts and instruments, 37
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,38 the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,39 the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, 40 the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction,41 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.42
Advocates of same-sex marriage have long argued that these documents
should be interpreted to provide a right to same-sex marriage. Those claims
have been notably unsuccessful. These human rights charters have not been
interpreted as requiring member states to redefine marriage to include
same-sex couples. For example, in Joslin v. New Zealand, the United
Nation's Human Rights Committee affirmed in 2002 that the
internationally recognized civil right of marriage created by the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights confers the obligation
on states "to recognize as marriage only the union between a man and a
36 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 16(3), G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); see generally Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration
ofHuman Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153 (1998); Don Browning, The Meaning ofFamily in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in 1 THE FAMILY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 38 (A. Scott
Loveless & Thomas B. Holman eds., 2007); Jane Adolphe, The Holy See and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights: Working Toward a Legal Anthropology of Human Rights and the Family, 4 AVE
MARIA L. REV. 343 (2006).
37 See Lynn D. Wardle, Federal Constitutional Protection for Marriage: Why and How, 20 BYU J.
PUB. L. 439, 483 (App. II) (listing 35 international treaties, charters, conventions and other instruments
with provisions acknowledging the important of families and/or marriage).
38 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 23, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI) (Dec. 16,
1966).
39 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 10 § 1, G.A. Res. 2200 A
(XXI), Annex, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 49 (Dec. 16,1966).
40 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),
G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, at 193 (Dec. 18, 1979).
41 The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980,
T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, availahle at
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act-conventions.text&cid=24. The Convention became enforceable
on Dec. 1, 1983.
42 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 4 4 b sess. (Nov. 20,
1989).
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woman wishing to marry each other." 43 This became the touchstone of
understanding these human rights documents, and the various member
states have been left to determine for themselves what recognition will be
given other domestic relationships. Similarly, in Rees v. United Kingdom,
the European Court of Human Rights held that the right to marry, as
protected by the European Convention on Human Rights, applies only to
"traditional marriage," leaving the individual states free to individually
determine the nature and degree of recognition to extend to other
relationships. 44 In March 2012, the European Court of Human Rights
declared in Gas and Dubois v. France: "The European Convention on
Human Rights does not require member states' governments to grant same-
sex couples access to marriage." 45 While it is to be expected that some pro-
same-sex union developments will come, given the political nature of the
issue, the consistent, overwhelming rejection of the claim for same-sex
marriage in the global arena to this point is noteworthy.
Thus, as a matter of comparative constitutional law and international
law, the trend to legalize same-sex marriage seems to have stalled (though
it is inching forward - in a total of ten nations in the past twelve years).
The trend now seems to be against same-sex marriage, with the sole
regional exception of a few jurisdictions in Western Europe and a few
former European colonies in North America and elsewhere. The global
norm is not to recognize same-sex marriage and to protect as a matter of
international human rights the ability of each nation to settle that policy
issue for itself.
B. Heterosexual Non-Marital Cohabitation
The status of non-marital heterosexual cohabitation without marriage 46 is
quite tenuous in the United States of America.47 No American state extends
43 Joslin v. New Zealand, Commc'n No. 902/1999, U.N. Doc. A/57/40, 214 (2002).
44 Rees v. United Kingdom, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. 56 (1986).
45 Affair Gas et Dubois c. France, Application No. 25951/07 (15 March 2012), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-109571 (last visited Oct. 20, 2012); see also
Donna Bowater, Gay marriage is not a human right, according to European ruling, The Telegraph
(UK) (Mar. 21, 2102), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/9157029/Gay-marriage-
is-not-a-human-right-according-to-European-ruling.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
46 Common law marriage in the United States is a full, valid marriage, differing from licensed
formal marriages only in the degree and details of formality required for celebration of the marriage. It
is not non-marital cohabitation, although in some parts of the world, the term "common law marriage"
is colloquially and misleadingly applied to non-marital cohabitation.
47 See generally Margaret M. Mahoney, Forces Shaping the Law of Cohabitation for Opposite Sex
Couples, 7 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 135 (2005); Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NoTRE DAME
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generally full marital rights and benefits to cohabiting non-marital non-gay
couples. Few states provide any benefits by statute specifically for
unmarried cohabitants. Some legal benefits (usually division of property
acquired during a relationship) derivative of a heterosexual may be
awarded in a handful of states (such as California and Washington).
However, most states (one recent Law Review Note says all but six
states) 48 allow for enforcement of private ordering by non-marital couples
of their financial relationships, such as by contract, partnership, or other
kinds of financial sharing or exchange. Professor Margaret Mahoney has
noted "the relationships established between cohabiting, opposite sex
couples are not regarded as family status relationships for most legal
purposes." 49 She identifies only five state legislatures (Hawaii, Vermont,
California, New Jersey and Maine) that have enacted domestic partnership
laws with statewide application and thirty-five municipalities that have
enacted domestic partnership ordinances. 50 However, "[m]ost of the
enacting jurisdictions are municipalities, where the primary rights
established are employee benefits for public employees with domestic
partners, such as family health benefits." 51 Professor Tom Oldham has
noted, in his review of the status of non-marital cohabitation in the United
States, that "because in most states cohabitants have no 'status'-like rights,
regardless of the duration of the cohabitation or whether the relationship
was childless or minor children were in the household, an 'unmarried'
couple can cohabit for a long period and raise children and still have no
rights or obligations (other than child support) when the relationship
ends."52 Professor Thomas Gallanis agrees that, "[t]he doctrines of
common-law marriage and the putative spouse aside, neither the case law
L. REV. 1381 (2001); J. Thomas Oldham, Lessons from Jerry Hall v. Mick Jagger Regarding U.S.
Regulation of Heterosexual Cohabitants or, Can't Get No Satisfaction, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1409
(2001); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Calibrated Commitment: The Legal Treatment of Marriage and
Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1435 (2001); see also Carol Bruch, Nonmarital Cohabitation in
the Common Law Countries: A Study in Judicial-Legislative Interaction, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 217
(1981); Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and
Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265 (2001).
48 John M. Yarwood, Breaking Up Is Hard To Do: Mini-DOMA Statutes, Migratory Same-Sex
Marriage Divorce, and a Practical Solution to Property Division, 89 B.U. L. REv. 1355, 1369 (2009).
49 Mahoney, supra note 46, at 160
50 Id. These numbers may include jurisdictions that have domestic partnership or such status for
only same-sex couples as well as jurisdictions that have domestic partnership or such status for
heterosexual couples alone or both same-sex and heterosexual couples.
51 Id. at 161.
52 Oldham, supra note 46, at 1411.
674
MARRIA GE AND OTHER DOMESTIC REL4 TIONSHIPS
nor the statutes of most states provide much recognition or protection for
unmarried cohabitants as a matter of status." 53
Additionally, under "palimony" and similar judicial doctrines, some
states allow cohabitants to claim a share of the property acquired by their
former partner during cohabitation or to assert claims for support or
equitable claims to some property or financial assets or income of their
former partner. 54 However, most of the states that allow such recovery base
the recovery on ordinary express or implied contract, partnership, or
equitable theories, not derived from the relationship itself. Moreover,
recovery of claims under these judicial doctrines has proven very difficult.
For example, in the seminal 1976 "palimony" case, Marvin v. Marvin,55
even though the California Supreme Court authorized many different
possible routes to establish a palimony claim (including written contract,
oral contract, implied contract, quantum meruit, partnership, implied
partnership, constructive trust, unjust enrichment, and other equitable
theories), the plaintiff, Michelle Marvin, was unable to prove any basis for
palimony recovery and received nothing.56 Moreover, the financial security
provided for non-marital cohabitants by these doctrines is very limited. As
Professor Ann Laquer Estin wrote,
Taken altogether, the legal norms of ordinary cohabitation developed in
the quarter century since Marvin are not particularly generous. Only a
small percentage of cohabitants will have even a possibility of legal
recovery when their relationships end. To the extent that these rules have
any effect on the choice between cohabitation and marriage, they are likely
to encourage marriage for anyone seeking financial security and to
encourage cohabitation rather than marriage for anyone seeking to avoid
financial commitments. 57
Non-marital cohabitation by heterosexuals is given some legal
recognition and quasi-marital benefits in some foreign nations under some,
though typically restricted, circumstances. However counting, let alone
classification, is extremely difficult due to the substantial difference
between legal systems, as well as due to the frequency of marginal or
informal protections afforded heterosexual non-marital couples or partners.
Many of the current legal practices, provisions, statuses and benefits
53 Gallanis, supra note 25, at 293-94.
54 See Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 558 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
55 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122-23 (Cal. 1976).
56 Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
57 Estin, supra note 46, at 1402-03.
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provided for heterosexual non-marital couples are vestiges of former times.
During those times, concubinage and similar relations were widespread and
divorce was very difficult or impossible to obtain. In some cases, such
protections for heterosexual non-marital couples functioned (especially
among the poor) like a form of common law marriage. 58 As in the United
States, it appears that more countries give some domestic partnership
registration, status, or benefits to same-sex non-marital couples than to
heterosexual non-marital couples. As Professor Mahoney explains,
[M]any foreign laws impose significant limitations on domestic
partnership status eligibility for opposite sex cohabitants by restricting the
status to same sex couples, and by excluding non-formalized, unregistered
relationships. Furthermore, the substantive legal consequences for
recognized opposite sex domestic partners are quite limited in many
countries. Still, by comparison to the laws of many other nations, the legal
recognition extended to opposite sex cohabitation as a significant family
relationship in the United States is minimal. 59
From a comparative law perspective, it is hard to draw any conclusion
from the practice of giving some legal recognition to some non-marital
heterosexual relations in some foreign nations. The diversity of practice,
the variety of approaches, the divergences in the legal systems, the wide
variations in the extent, scope, and type of recognition or benefits extended,
the conditions for obtaining them, and the holes in the data are so great as
to make even broad comparisons misleading at best and analytically
unreliable.
Overall, the movement toward legal recognition of both same-sex unions
and dual-gender-non-marital unions is slow and spotty. In the U.S.
recognition of heterosexual non-marital relationships is quite restricted.
While some other countries clearly do offer some heterosexual non-marital
couples greater legal recognition or benefits than most American states, the
record is quite ambiguous. The differences among the other legal systems
in legal treatment of such relationships are vast, and specific legal customs
of other nations, such as concubinage, often proceed from a history of
class, gender, and economic exploitation and corruption that hardly makes
those practices a model for our nation or legal system.
58 See Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American Law Institute's
"Domestic Partners" Proposal, 2001 BYU L. REv. 1189, 1205-06 (2001) (reviewing history and
doctrine of concubinage).
59 Mahoney, supra note 46, at 163.
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II. A RESPONSE TO THE "EQUAL-VALUE" CLAIM: ALL RELATIONSHIPS
ARE NOT ALIKE
It is hard to disagree with the proposition that "the law should support
the diverse families and relationships in which children and adults
flourish."60 The problem and disagreement come in identifying and
agreeing on which relationships are the kinds of relationships in which
children and adults actually do "flourish." Many advocates of giving legal
status to same-sex marriage or of giving full marital benefits and status to
non-marital intimate relations, argue that non-marital relationships are just
as beneficial to children, adults, and society as marriage is, and contribute
just as much to society as marriage does. Thus, these advocates argue that
same-sex couples deserve to receive equal treatment with marriage in the
laws. 61
The equal value claim forces all of us to address two key questions that
have been ignored in our society for some time. First, what is it about
marriage that justifies it being defined so narrowly and exclusively?
Second, why should only conjugal heterosexual marriages be given legal
marriage status and certain marital benefits?
We have taken marriage for granted for a long time, and the "treat-all-
relationships-as-equal-to-marriage" proposal forces us to rediscover what
marriage is, why it is so important to society, and why it is given such a
unique and preferred status in law. Surprisingly, despite the strong,
decades-long, growing challenge of same-sex marriage and other non-
marital relations, the public discourse in America has yet to seriously
grapple with those questions.
Legal scholars, students, and policy-makers in particular need to address
these questions. Whether non-marital intimate relations should be given
legal treatment equivalent or largely equivalent to marriage ultimately turns
on whether heterosexual conjugal marriage makes a unique contribution to
society, advancing the social purposes for which the state has established
the preferred legal institution of marriage, or whether non-marital intimate
relations make the same or equivalent contributions towards the
achievement of the social purposes of marriage.
To answer this question we must (1) identify the social interests that
constitute the public purposes of legal marriage, and (2) compare the
60 Nancy Polikoff, Law that Values All Families: Beyond Straight and Gay Marriage, 22 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIM. L. 85, 91 (2009).
61 POLIKOFF, supra note 3, at 3.
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contributions that heterosexual conjugal marriages make toward those
social interests with the contributions that non-marital intimate relations
make toward those or similar social interests. The comparison requires that
we compile lists of both positive and negative qualities and characteristics,
including a list of the benefits and contributions provided to society by the
particular form of relationship and a list of the harms and problems
associated generally with the form of relationship. Then we must balance
the ledger, so to speak. This task is difficult and makes some people
uncomfortable for two reasons.
First, some of the qualitative benefits of marriage are hard to measure.
Not all of the value of marriage can be reduced to quantifiable figures and
statistics. There are some dimensions of the human experience, including
human emotional relationships that may not yet be adequately understood
or quantified by existing social science.
Second, making comparisons about personal lifestyles makes many of us
feel awkward. Many people do not like to make comparisons of such
intimate and personal things. 62 Even if they think that one kind of
relationship is bad, and another is good, they believe that modesty or
privacy preclude them from saying that publicly. It seems judgmental to
some to compare. Others believe that such things are completely relative or
subjective; that whatever kind of relationship a person thinks is best is the
best for that person. They believe there is not any objective, best kind of
relationship for society. Some people oppose making comparisons so
much that they get very upset, and start labeling people who undertake the
task as "judgmental," "bigoted," "homophobic," or "narrow-minded." This
hostility generates and supports the taboo against asking such comparative
questions or doing such comparative research, unless it is designed to show
that conjugal marriage is not superior to non-marital relationships,
including same-sex relationships.
Whether non-marital intimate relations really do contribute as much to
society and social needs as conjugal heterosexual marriage is a critical
question, which deserves to be taken seriously and given a serious answer.
What is marriage, and why is it defined so narrowly as to include only
the monogamous union of an adult, consenting, unmarried, competent man
and woman? 63 Marriage is a term used in many different contexts with
62 Indeed, a major contribution of contemporary feminism and several other perspectives (such as
the Therapeutic Jurisprudence movement) emphasizes this reality by valuing emotion qua emotion, and
in trying to protect good relationships qua relationships.
63 These six qualities are both historically prevalent and widely accepted in the modem world. A
survey in 1996 of marriage laws in sixteen nations around the world identified these six qualities as the
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many possible meanings. It may mean different things in law than in
religion, sociology, psychology, or within particular families. The
questions raised by Professor Polikoff concern the public institution of
legal marriage. The proposed legalization of same-sex marriage concerns
the meaning of legal marriage-that is, the state-regulated public status
called "marriage," and the essential legal benefits flowing from that legal
relationship. It is not about whether some private group of people may or
should consider same-sex couples as "married" for their own purposes, i.e.,
for purpose of membership in their church or private organization, or for
purposes of religious doctrine, or for purposes of etiquette-who should be
invited to what events, or seated next to whom. 64 If same-sex marriage is
not legalized, that does not prevent some individuals, some families, some
religions, some psychologists, or other private groups from considering
same-sex unions as marriages for their own private purposes.
At a simplistic, positivist level, it can be said that legal marriage is
whatever lawmakers say it is. That answer tells us very little about
marriage, but tells us something important about law. The lawmakers in
any legal system may define marriage however they choose. If they choose
to confer the legal status of marriage only on relations between one adult
male and one adult female, it is so. On the other hand, if they choose, they
could provide that two men, or two women, or three persons of any gender
may marry. They could allow father-daughter relations, or brother-sister
relations- to be legal marriages and for purposes of law in that
jurisdiction, that is what legal marriage would be. This reductionist
answer, however, does not help us know much about marriage, only about
who decides what marriage is.
Historically, sociologically, and anthropologically, marriage is a pre-
legal institution. The law does not create marriage any more than it creates
children or land.65 Rather, the law attempts to regulate marriage to protect
common requirements of marriage globally. Lynn D. Wardle, International Marriage and Divorce
Regulation and Recognition: A Survey, 29 FAM. L. Q. 497, 500 (1995). At that time, a few dozen
Muslim nations allowed polygamous marriage, and since then, five nations (less than three percent of
all sovereign nations) and a handful of dependent or subordinate jurisdictions (municipalities,
provinces, states, etc.) have legalized same-sex marriage. But the overwhelming globally prevailing
pattem continues to define marriage in terms of these six requirements.
64 1 know some people who were lawfully married and later divorced by their spouses who still, in
their own hearts, consider themselves married in some ways (for purposes of giving gifts at Christmas,
or for purposes of giving financial support), or in the eyes of their family or in-laws' family they are
treated for many purposes as if they were still married, or in the eyes of church they are still considered
married.
65 Teresa Stanton Collett, Reconizing Same-Sex Marriage: Asking for the Impossible? 47 CATH.
U. L. REV. 1245, 1663 (1998) ("The state does not create marriage. It recognized the pre-existing
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and promote important social interests and the well being of all individuals
in society.
Substantively, in law, marriage refers to two things. First, it refers to a
specific, unique legal institution that has been and is recognized and given
special treatment in the law of domestic relations and which is defined and
regulated by the state. It is a special kind of family relationship, namely
the relationship of husband and wife. This can be called marriage status,
and the area of law that regulates it is called marriage law, or (more
generally) family law. This can be distinguished from what can be called
marriage benefits, which is a set of legal rights and privileges for which
marriage status provides eligibility or qualification.
What is it about the special committed relationship between a man and a
woman that has led lawmakers throughout all time, and across all cultures,
to confer upon this relationship the special, preferred legal status of
marriage? Why has the state chosen to make conjugal marriage between a
man and a woman (and no other kind of intimate relationship) a unique
public institution and given special legal benefits to the institution and its
spouses? The answer to these and similar questions is that conjugal
heterosexual marriages have been given special legal preference because
they make uniquely valuable contributions to the state, to society, and to
individuals. Heterosexual marriages have been singled out from all kinds
of adult relationships for preferred status because they are so distinctively
important and uniquely valuable to society and to the stability and
continuity of the state, and to achieving the purposes for which the state
exists. Legal marriage, as distinct from marriage as a religious, social or
familial institution, is a public institution established to achieve public
purposes. It is not the private consequences but the public consequences of
heterosexual conjugal marriage that are relevant to the public policy issue
of whether a particular relationship should be given the public status of
marriage.
Advocates of extending truly marital benefits to non-marital intimate
relations, including same-sex couples, assert their challenge: Prove that
reality."); Joel A. Nichols, Misunderstanding Marriage and Missing Religion, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV.
195, 197-98 (2011) (refuting argument that "marriage is a creation of the state"); David Orgon
Coolidge, Essay, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning of Marriage, 28 So. TEX. L.
REv. 1, 53 ("marriage does not exist because of state recognition"); see also Maggie Gallagher, What
Marriage Is For, available at http://www.commonsenseissues.com/what-marriage-is-for/ (last visited
Oct. 20, 2012); Maggie Gallagher, Get Involved, available at
http://www.catholievote.org/index.php?/site/issues details/marriage and family/ (last visited Oct. 20,
2012).
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conjugal relations are unique and uniquely beneficial to society. But they
have the burden of proof backward. The burden of proof is upon those who
propose a radical redefinition, or "leveling," of marriage to show that their
proposal will not harm the long-established dual-gender social institution of
marriage or otherwise harm society, especially families and children.
There are many important public interests in and social purposes for
marriage as to which conjugal marriages provides tremendous benefits to
society that are unequalled by non-marital intimate relations. Elsewhere, I
have identified and discussed at least eight concurrent and unique
contributions of conjugal marriage in general to social welfare that are
demonstrably significant. 66 These include: (1) safe sexual relations, (2)
responsible procreation, (3) optimal child-rearing, (4) healthy human
development, particularly for the most vulnerable, (5) protecting the status
of women, especially of wives and mothers, (6) securing the stability and
integrity of the basic unit of society, (7) fostering civic virtue, democracy,
and social order, and (8) facilitating inter-jurisdictional compatibility.
The evidence that committed heterosexual unions that are called
marriages make unique and uniquely important contributions to achieving
the public and social purposes of marriage is overwhelming. To quickly
summarize: Committed conjugal unions of marriage provide the best
setting for the safest and most beneficial expression of sexual intimacy.
Conjugal marriage provides the best environment into which children can
be born. Conjugal marriage provides the greatest and most advantageous
environment in which children can be reared, providing profound benefits
of dual-gender parenting to model inter-gender relations, and best showing
children how to relate to persons of their own and the opposite gender.
Conjugal marriage provides the most enriching and liberating relationship
to facilitate human men and women to personally develop and achieve the
fullest potential. Conjugal marriage provides the best security for the status
of women (who take the greatest risks and invest the greatest personal
effort in creating and maintaining families). Conjugal marriage provides
the strongest and most stable companionate unit of society, the most secure
setting for intergenerational transmission of social knowledge and skills,
and reflects the understanding of marriage that has been constant across
66 See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage,
1996 BYU L. REV. 1; Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same Sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a
Retreat from Marriage by Redefining Marriage, 39 S. TEx. L. REV. 735 (1998); Lynn D. Wardle,
Multiply and Replenish: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital
Procreation, 24 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 771 (2001); Lynn D. Wardle, The Morality of Marriage and
the Transformative Power of Inclusion, in WHAT'S THE HARM? 207-38 (Lynn Wardle ed., University
Press of America 2008).
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cultures and throughout history. Marriage is of such profound importance
to society that there is great danger if its meaning and definition become
ambiguous. Conjugal marriage provides the best seed ground for
democracy, the most important schoolroom for self-government, the most
important wellspring of (and testing ground for) civic virtue, and the most
valuable unit of social organization. Conjugal marriage facilitates inter-
jurisdictional comity and intercultural understanding in many ways that
would be threatened by legalizing same-sex marriage.
These are long established, historically recognized, currently
substantiated qualities of conjugal marriage. If they are true, or even
substantially so, it must be acknowledged that conjugal marriages
contribute much more to the social interests in and public policy reasons
for legalized marriage than do non-marital intimate relations. Overall, the
benefits and value of conjugal marriages to society far exceed those of non-
marital intimate relations. The burden of disproving them lies upon the
advocates of the equal-value claim, and until now they have failed to carry
their burden of proof. Absent such proof, from the perspective of the social
interests and public purposes that underlie the legal status of marriage, the
claim that non-marital intimate relations are equivalent to heterosexual
conjugal marriage must fail.
Today it is not uncommon to hear advocates of same-sex marriage or
equivalent unions argue that non-marital relationships (including same-sex
relationships) provide a good, safe, and healthy environment for raising
children equivalent to that provided by marriage. 67 It is also common to
hear claims that non-marital relationships have no higher rates of social
pathologies (such as domestic violence, child physical abuse, child sexual
molestation, break-up, and poverty) than do marital relationships. 68 While
there are certainly significant failings in marriages today, these claims rest
in some part upon a tragically blind denial of reality.
While one need not believe that all of the claims about the profound gap
between quality factors in marital and non-marital relationships and
between child development experiences for children raised in marital and
non-marital relationships are flawless or unimpeachable, the overwhelming
size, scope, depth, and weight of the social science evidence, which has
grown consistently, from researchers on the left and right, from a variety of
disciplines, for three or more decades, leaves no room for reasonable minds
to doubt that there is a very real, measurable, persistent, significant gap
67 See, e.g., POLIKOFF, supra note 3, at 52-55, 66-70, 73-79, 84-88.
68 Id. at 78-82.
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between conjugal marital and all non-marital relations generally.
Significant advantages for conjugal marriage exist with respect to the
number, rate, degree, kinds and nature of benefits they provide to children,
adults, families and society. There also exists a very real, measurable,
persistent, significant gap between marital and non-marital relations
demonstrating significant potential risks associated with non-marital
relationships with respect to the number, rate, degree, kinds and nature of
harms they produce for children, adults, families and society. Today, it is
beyond serious dispute that statistical rates of some social pathologies (such
as domestic violence, child physical abuse, child sexual molestation,
drug/alcohol abuse, break-up, and poverty), and particularly disadvantages
for children, are significantly higher in non-marital relationships than in
marital relationships, and the rates of some positive social goods
(education, employment, physical and mental health, income, wealth
acquisition, quality of relationships) are notably lower for non-marital
(including same-sex) relationships and families than for conjugal marriages
and marital families. 69 The refusal to acknowledge the uncontestable reality
that, compared to non-marital cohabitation, including same-sex coupling,
conjugal marriage is a very real, powerful, statistically significant dividing
line separating families with respect to at least some benefits and burdens,
especially regarding children, is remarkable. 70
Factually, the evidence is clear that "[t]he notion that all 'family forms'
are equally as helpful or healthful for children has no basis in science." 71
For example, following an impressive review of the quantitative data,
Professors W. Bradford Wilcox and Robin Fretwell Wilson recently
concluded that, generally, "children do best in a married home, compared
to the alternatives." 72 While human relations always produce exceptions, it
bears emphasizing that an impressive body of empirical research strongly
69 See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Form and Substance in Parentage Law, 15 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 203 (2006); see also Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on
Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833 (1997); see also Mark Regnerus, How different are the adult
children of parents who have same-sex relationships? Findings from the New Family Structures Study,
41 Soc. Sc. REs. 752 (2012)
70 William C. Duncan, The Social Good of Marriage and Legal Responses to Non-Marital
Cohabitation, 82 OR. L. REv. 1001, 1011, 1014, 1029 (2003).
71 A. Dean Byrd, Gender Complementarity and Child-Rearing: Where Tradition and Science
Agree, 6 J. L. & FAM. STuD. 213, 213 (2004).
72 W. Bradford Wilcox & Robin Fretwell Wilson, Bringing Up Baby: Adoption, Marriage and the
Best Interests of the Child, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 883, 891-904 (2006) (defending marital
preference in light of data); see also Robin Fretwell Wilson, Evaluating Marriage: Does Marriage
Matter to the Nurturing of Children?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 847, 857-64 (2005) (discussing recently
well-designed definitive studies that confirm that children raised in marital homes do better on a host of
child welfare factors than children raised in non-marital homes).
2012] 683
684 JOURNAL OF CIVIL RGIflS & ECONOMCDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 26:3
supports the immense value of conjugal-marital child-rearing generally. 73
Taking a macro-perspective of the accumulating data (rather than a precise
methodological examination of each quantitative study), it appears that the
evidence is simply overwhelming and growing,74 but it is still very
unpopular in many circles. As Psychologist and Professor A. Dean Byrd
explained,
Children [raised by their married mother and father] navigate
developmental stages more easily, are more solid in their gender identity,
perform better in academic tasks at school, have fewer emotional disorders
and become better functioning adults when they are reared by dual-gender
parents. This conclusion, supported further by a plethora of research
spanning decades, clearly demonstrates gender-linked differences in child-
rearing that are protective for children. 75
In fact, "[tihere is no fact that has been established by social science
literature more convincingly than the following: all variables considered,
children are best served when reared in a home with a married mother and
father."76 Homes with a father and mother who are married to each other
(and do not have high conflicts) provide the best environment for raising
73 See supra note 65, for a list of the author's prior publications reviewing the social science
evidence. See also Regnerus, supra note 68.
74 For some accessible compilations of the existing research, see ELIZABETH MARQUARDT,
BETWEEN TWO WORLDS, THE INNER LIVES OF CHILDREN OF DIVORCE (Crown 2005); JUDITH
WALLERSTEIN, JULIA LEWIS & SANDRA BLAKESLY, THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE (Hyperion
2000); LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE (Doubleday 2000); PAUL
R. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK, GROWING UP IN AN ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL
passim (Harvard Univ. Press 1997); GENERATIVE FATHERING: BEYOND DEFICIT PERSPECTIVES passim
(Alan J. Hawkins & David C. Dollahite eds., 1997); GLENN T. STANTON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS
97-122 (NavPress 1997) (summarizing studies showing disadvantages of single parenting); DAVID
POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER: COMPELLING NEW EVIDENCE THAT FATHERHOOD AND MARRIAGE
ARE INDISPENSABLE FOR THE GOOD OF CHILDREN AND SOCIETY passim (Free Press 1996); BARBARA
DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE (Knopf 1996); DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS
AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM (Harper Perennial 1995); SARA
McLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT
HELPS passim (Harvard Univ. Press 1994); JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND
CHANCES (Ticknor & Fields 1989); see also WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: TWENTY CONCLUSIONS FROM
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Institute for American Values, 2001); WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: TWENTY-SIX
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Institute for American Values, W. Bradford Wilcox, 2d
ed., 2005); The Consequences of Marriage for African Americans: A Comprehensive Literature Review
(Institute for American Values, 2005); Institute for American Values, Family Structure and Childfren's
Educational Outcomes (Institute for American Values, 2005), available at www.americanvlaues.org
(last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
75 Byrd, supra note 70, at 214.
76 Id; see also POPENOE, supra note 73, at 176 ("Social science research is almost never
conclusive . . . yet in three decades of work as a social scientist, I know of few other bodies of data in
which the weight of evidence is so decisively on one side of the issue: on the whole, for children, two-
parent families are preferable to single-parent and step-families.").
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emotionally stable children.77 Research published in 2012 by Professor
Mark Regnerus round that children of mothers who have had same-sex
relationships were significantly different as young adults on 25 of the 40
(63%) outcome measures, compared with those who spent their entire
childhood with both their married, biological parents. For example,
children parented by lesbian mothers reported significantly lower levels of
income, more receipt of public welfare, lower levels of employment, poorer
mental and physical health, poorer relationship quality with current partner,
and higher levels of smoking and criminality. Their outcomes were
comparable to (and in some cases lower than) the outcomes for children
raised in never-married and divorced parents.78
Many experts have noted that "[the most important causal factor of
[recent declines in American] child well-being is the remarkable collapse
of marriage, leading to growing family instability and decreasing parental
investment in children." 79 University of Chicago demographer Linda Waite
has stated that, "[o]n average, children of married parents are physically
and mentally healthier, better educated, and later in life, enjoy more career
success than children in other family settings. Children with married
parents are also more likely to escape some of the more common disasters
of later-twentieth-century childhood and adolescence."80
This is true of virtually all forms of non-marital relations. Thus,
compared to children of marital families, children of divorce or without
fathers in their home are at the greatest risk of crime, child abuse,
premarital sex, premarital pregnancy, poverty, lower education, and such
children perform more poorly in school and have less career success. 81
"Compared with children with continuously married parents, children with
divorced parents continued to score significantly lower on measures of
academic achievement, conduct, psychological adjustment, self-concept,
and social relations."82
77 POPENOE, supra note 73.
78 Regnerus, supra note 68.
79 See, e.g., Bruce C. Hafen, Bridle Your Passions: How Modern Law Can Protect the Family, 63
VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 633, 5 (1997).
80 LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE 124 (2000); see generally
Linda J. Waite, Does Marriage Matter?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 483, 497-98 (1995).
81 Id. at 124-34; see also E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON AND JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR
WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED (W.W. Norton & Co. 2002); JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN, SANDRA
BLAKESLEE, AND JULIA M. LEWIS, THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A 25 YEAR LANDMARK
STUDY (Hyperion 2000).
82 See Paul R. Amato, Children of Divorce in the 1990's: An Update of the Amato & Keith (1991)
Meta-Analysis, 15 J. FAM. PSYCH. 355 (2001); see generally Institute for American Values, The
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One specific example (and not necessarily the strongest) is the
relationship between family structure and adolescent (especially male)
crime.83 Single-parent Sara McLanahan of Princeton has shown that
"[b]oys raised outside of intact marriages are two to three times more likely
to commit a crime leading to incarceration by the time they are in their
early thirties, even after controlling for race, family background,
neighborhood quality, and cognitive ability." 84
Separation of children from their fathers for whatever reason, in
whatever alternative relationship structure, is generally recognized to be
"the engine driving our most urgent social problems, from crimes to
adolescent pregnancy to child abuse to domestic violence against
women."8 5 The 2006 National Report on Juvenile Offenders and Victims
from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention of the U.S.
Department of Justice states, "Juveniles who lived with both biological
parents had lower lifetime prevalence of law violating behaviors than did
juveniles who lived in other family types." 86 For example, the U.S.
Department of Justice 2006 National Report noted that one study found that
5% of youth age 17 who lived with both biological parents reported ever
being in a gang, compared with 12% of youth who lived in other family
arrangements. Similarly, youth at age 17 living with both biological
parents reported a lower lifetime prevalence, compared with youth living in
other types of families, of widely ranging problem behaviors: marijuana
use (30% vs. 40%), hard drug use (9% vs. 13%), drug selling (13% vs.
19%), running away from home (13% vs. 25%), vandalism (34% vs. 41%),
theft of something worth more than $50 (19% vs. 17%), and assault with
the intent to seriously injure (20% vs. 35%).87
Marriage Movement: A Statement of Principles (2000), available at
http://www.americanvalues.org/pdfs/marriagemovement.pdf.
83 See Lynn D. Wardle, The Fall of Marital Stability and the Rise ofJuvenile Delinquency, 10 J. L.
& FAM. STUD. 83 (2007) (the source of much of the data and discussion herein); Lynn D. Wardle,
Children and the Future of Marriage, 17 REGENT U. L. REv. 279 (2004-2005) (partial literature
review).
84 See The Marriage Movement, supra note 80 (citing Cynthia C. Harper and Sara S. McLanahan,
Father Absence and Youth Incarceration (1998) (paper presented at annual meeting of American
Sociological Association, San Francisco, Aug. 1998); see also MCLANAHAN ET AL., supra, note 73
(discussing the many negative outcomes for children that are associated with being raised by a single
parent).
85 See BLANKENHORN, supra note 73, at 1.
86 Howard M. Snyder & Melissa Stickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 National
Report, at 72 (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention & National
Center for Juvenile Justice March 2006), available at http://ojdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/nr2006/index.html
(last visited June 12, 2007).
87 Id
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The "presence of a residential and biological father reduces the
likelihood of violent behavior by his sons grown to adulthood," and "[d]ata
analyzed across the U.S. indicate that father absence, rather than poverty,
[is] the stronger predictor of young men's violent behavior." 88 The
likelihood that a young male "will engage in criminal activity doubles if he
is raised without a father, and triples if he lives in a neighborhood with a
high concentration of single-parent families." 89 Many surveys show that
children living apart from their fathers are far more likely than other
children to display emotional and behavioral problems, to have difficulty
getting along with their peers, and to get in trouble with the police.
"They . . . have more social adjustment problems . . . "90
Data analyzed across the U.S. indicate that father absence, rather than
poverty, was a strong predictor of young men's violent behavior.
Predictions of violent crime rates based on the level of out-of-wedlock
births from the prior generation were superior to predictions that were
based on adult violent crime rates and levels of out-of-wedlock births from
the same time frame. A consonant pattern was found in cross-national
surveys. 91
Likewise, an increase in out of wedlock births significantly increased the
homicide arrest rates among those children when they were 15 to 19-year-
olds, suggesting a long-term negative effect of childbearing out of
wedlock.92 The effect of family structure was "both statistically significant
and substantively strong."93 One government report concluded that
regardless of all other socio-economic factors, adolescents living apart
88 Wade C. Mackey & Ronald S. Immerman, The Presence of the Social Father in Inhibiting
Young Men's Violence, 44 MANKIND Q. 339, 339 (2004).
89 M. ANNE HILL & JUNE O'NEILL, UNDERCLASS BEHAVIORS IN THE UNITED STATES:
MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS (New York, City University of New York, 1993);
see generally Patrick Fagan and Robert Rector: The Effects of Divorce on America, WORLD AND I
MAG. (Oct. 2000) (listing numerous negative outcomes, especially relating to children, from divorce).
Another study reported that the "relationship between crime and one-parent families" is "so strong that
controlling for family configuration erases the relationships between race and crime and between low
income and crime." BLANKENHORN, supra note 83, at 31.
90 See HILL, supra note 87; see also Wardle, the Fall, supra note 81, at 88-97.
91 Wade C. Mackey & Bonnie Mackey, The Presence of Fathers in Attenuating Young Male
Violence: Dad as a Social Palliative, 35 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 63, 63 (2003).
92 M. Robert O'Brien & Jean Stockard, The Cohort-Size, Sample-Size Conundrum: An Empirical
Analysis and Assessment Using Homicide Arrest Data from 1960-1999, 19 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2003); see also Robert M. O'Brien, Jean Stockard & Lynne Isaacson, The Enduring
Effects of Cohort Characteristics on Age-specific Homicide Rates, 1960-1995, 104 AM. J. Soc. 1061
(1999).
93 Robert O'Brien & Jean Stockard, The Cohort-Size, Sample-Size Conundrum: An Empirical
Analysis and Assessment Using Homicide Arrest Data from 1960-1999, 19 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 22 (2003) ("[T]he effects of relative cohort size and family structure on age-period-
specific homicide arrest rates are both statistically significant and substantively strong. As in earlier
analyses, the influence of family structure is stronger than that of relative cohort size in all analyses.").
2012] 687
JOURNAL OF CIVILRIGH7S & ECONOMCDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 26:3
from a biological mother or father are 50-150 percent more likely to abuse
and be dependent on drugs and need illicit drug-abuse treatment compared
to their peers living with both biological parents. 94
It is apparent that even intact families that have high levels of conflict
show delinquency rates as high as disrupted families. 95 Marriage certainly
is not a guarantee of success in family life. (In this day of high divorce
rates, does that surprise anyone?) So family structure (e.g., marriage) may
be a shorthand way of referring to family interaction factors and dynamics
such as conflict, control, communication, caring and trust, identity, support,
etc., which other research has shown to correlate with delinquency.96 But
that is the whole point of marriage as a dividing line or classification-
research consistently shows that intact conjugal marriage is a statistically
reliable "short-hand" for positive characteristics and the generation of
positive social benefits and the minimization of negative social qualities
and pathologies.97 Numerous studies have shown a clear link between
family form or structure and juvenile delinquency, and some family
paradigms are more closely linked with juvenile delinquency than others. 98
Marriage provides a much better environment for the successful
development and raising of children and for fostering successful, healthy
adult intimate relationships than the various forms of non-marital
cohabitation (including same-sex coupling). 99
There also is strong evidence that form matters in adult intimate relations
for adults, as well. Heterosexual cohabitation is significantly less
94 ROBERT A. JOHNSON, JOHN P. HOFFMAN, & DEAN R. GERSTEIN, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
FAMILY STRUCTURE AND ADOLESCENT SUBSTANCE USE 2 (Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration, Office of Applied Studies 1996).
95 Heather Juby & David P. Farrington, Disentangling the Link between Disrupted Families and
Delinquency, BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 22 (2001), available at
http://www.fact.on.ca/news/news0 103/410022.pdf (last visited July 5, 2007).
96 Stephen A. Cernkovich & Peggy Giordano, Family Relationships and Delinquency, 25
CRIMINOLOGY 295, 296 (1987), available at http://www.blackwell-
synergy.com/doi/pdf/1 0.111 1/j. 1745-9125.1987.tb00799.x.
97 See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Form and Substance in Parentage Law, I5 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 203 (2006); Lynn D. Wardle, All You Need Is Love?, 14 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUDIES
51 (2004).
98 See Rolf Loeber & Magda Stouthamer-Loeber, Family Factors as Correlates and Predictors of
Juvenile Conduct Problems and Delinquency, 7 CRIME & JUSTICE 29, 125 (1986), available at
http://www.jstor.org/view/01923234/ap040007/04a00030/0 (last visited July 5, 2007); see also Crystal
L. Murry, Jimmy Williams, & Randall T. Salekin, Juvenile Delinquency and Family Structure, U. ALA.
MCNAIR J. 87 (2004), available at http://graduate.ua.edu/mcnair/joumals/2006/CrystalMurry.pdf
(summarizing juvenile court records from Alabama in 1996 which confirm that fewer juvenile
delinquents reside in two-parent homes, but fail to show a correlation between serious juvenile crimes
or recidivism and not living in a two-parent home).
99 See generally Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of
Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REv. 815, 861-62 (2005).
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beneficial for adults, children, and society than conjugal marriage.
Researchers and cohabiters both agree that cohabitation is distinguished
and distinguishable from marriage in many significant aspects. 100 National
survey results show that cohabitors generally report poorer relationship
quality than their married counterparts.101 Cohabitation fosters attitudes
about commitment and relationships that foster instability and break-up.102
Symptoms of depression are higher among some persons in cohabitation
relationships (especially men) than among married persons.10 3 Domestic
violence is notably higher in cohabitation relationships than in
marriages.104 Most cohabitation is short-lived--only ten percent (10%) of
cohabiting relationships last five years or longer.105 Children being raised
in a cohabitation relationship are at severe disadvantages in numerous
dimensions of their lives, from potential for abuse to molestation to poverty
to exposure to drugs, to school under-performance. As a pair of
researchers recently documented,
[w]e find that youth in "intact" families differ in important ways
depending on whether the two biological parents are married or cohabiting
and on whether they have children from a previous relationship. In
addition, we find that youth who reside with a single biological parent who
cohabits with a non-biological partner exhibit an unusually high rate of
antisocial behavior, especially if the custodial parent is the biological
father. 106
100 Wendy D. Manning & Pamela J. Smock, Measuring and Modeling Cohabitation: New
Perspectives From Qualitative Data, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 989, 989-1002 (2005); Judith A. Seltzer,
Cohabitation in the United States and Britain: Demography, Kinship, and the Future, 66 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 921, 92-928 (2004); see generally DAVID POPENOE & BARABARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD,
SHOULD WE LIVE TOGETHER? WHAT YOUNG ADULTS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT COHABITATION BEFORE
MARRIAGE: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF RECENT RESEARCH (1999), available at
http://www.virginia.edu/marriageproject/pdfs/swlt2.pdf
101 Bruce Wydick, Grandma was Right: Why Cohabitation Undermines Relational Satisfaction,
But Is Increasing Anyway, 60 KYKLOS 617, 617 (2007); Susan Brown & Alan Booth, Cohabitation
Versus Marriage: A Comparison ofRelationship Quality, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 668, 669 (1996).
102 Steven L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships, 16 J. FAM. ISSUES
53, 57-58 (1995).
103 Galena H. Rhoades et al., A Longitudinal Study of Cohabiting Couples' Reasons for
Cohabitation, Relationship Quality, and Psychological Well-Being, 68 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS
INTERNATIONAL: SECTION B: THE SCIENCES AND ENGINEERING 8-B, 5637 (2007), available at
http://jerome.stjohns.edu:81/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/304862207?accountid=1406
8.
104 POPENOE & DAFOE, supra note 98, at 3.
105 Seltzer, supra note 98, at 924.
106 Robert Apel & Catherine Kaukinen, On the Relationship Between Family Structure and
Antisocial Behavior: Parental Cohabitation and Blended Households, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 35, 35 (2008).
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Thus, the overwhelming evidence is that the welfare of adults, as well as
children, is enhanced and advantaged in conjugal marriage as compared to
non-marital relationships in general. The claim in Beyond that all
relationships are essentially equal in quality is factually untenable in the
twenty-first century.
Thus, as a matter of rational public policy, it makes sense for the law to
entice and channel (but not force) willing couples into the optimal form of
relationships (marriage) to prevent harm to children, adult individuals,
families, society, and the institution of marriage. The law and courts utilize
marriage as a shorthand substitute for substance. The form is presumed to
raise a presumption of substance usually rebuttable only upon proof that a
party has fallen below the minimum-tolerable level of parenting.
The focus primarily on marriage as a dividing line for benefits preserves
and reinforces marriage as an institution. There are no formless
institutions; the forms of institutions are part of its presence and identity.
To level all forms of adult intimate relationships (by making them equal in
the law, by piercing the form and focusing on substance instead) would
destroy marriage as an institution, and destroy with it its positive
institutional influence. By making the form of marriage invisible, the
institution of marriage also becomes invisible. As institutions such as
marriage wither and deteriorate, the social influence they exerted on
members of society (especially on children, adolescents, and adults in times
of turmoil) also weakens and wanes. As the informal, non-legal influence
of social institutions weakens, the need for government to exert its
influence increases. Thus, as the law moves from making the form of
marriage primarily determinative of legal benefits and to focusing on
internal substance, or levels all relationships of intimacy, it undermines the
ability of the institution of marriage to perform valuable social channeling
and regulating functions through informal means, and increases the need
for the state to exert its power over individuals and families through more
coercive and - may we say formal - means. 107
Moreover, marriage as a form or dividing line does not merely represent,
substitute for, and raise a presumption of the substance of good relations
and good parenting and responsibility. Conjugal marriage actually
engenders, generates, reinforces, nurtures, supports, cultivates and
enhances the very substance of good relations, good parenting and
responsibility. The substance of these socially desirable qualities thrives in
107 Jennifer Roback Morse, Marriage and the Limits of Contract, POL'Y REV. (Apr. 1, 2005),
available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6909.
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some forms (such as in marriage and marital parenting) and struggles in
many others (including cohabitation, same-sex unions, polygamous
relations, etc.). Thus, the form of marriage is substance not only because it
is demonstrably associated with good substance, but also because to some
extent it actually helps to create, foster, engender, and increase the socially
beneficial substances that public policy wants to promote.
Similar concerns about "false equivalence" exist regarding "civil union"
regimes in which all of the same rights, benefits and privileges of marriage
are accorded to same-sex couples who register in civil unions. Such civil
unions are functionally and effectively same-sex marriages with another
label. Marriage is not just a label. There also is a substance of marriage.
The substance of marriage is the bundle of rights and duties which the laws
and which society confers upon the unique (and uniquely valuable)
relationship. Relationships that are given that bundle of rights are in
substance, in reality, "marriages." As Shakespeare suggested, "that which
we call a rose, [b]y any other word would smell as sweet."108
Civil unions give all of the substance of marriage-the entire bundle of
legal rights, duties and privileges of marriage-to same-sex couples. Thus,
they create same-sex marriage in substance. But they preserve the name,
the label, and status of "marriage" for male-female unions. Conceptually,
this has some appeal as a compromise proposal. However, to confer the
substance of marriage by "cut-and-paste" civil union legislation but not the
label of marriage may create a "truth-in-labeling" problem.
Moreover, same-sex civil unions do a disservice to same-sex couples.
Marriage, for millennia, has exclusively been a gender-integrating
relationship. The legal rights and responsibilities of marriage-the
substance of the benefits, duties, and privileges conferred and provided for
married couples in the law of marriage-has been customized over the
millennia, for the particular qualities of male-female unions. To simply
"cut-and-paste" the legal benefits, rights and duties that were specifically
crafted for male-female couples and extend them to same-sex couples (by
copying the legal qualities and benefits of marriage law and pasting those
legal provisions into "civil union" regimes for same-sex couples) is like
taking a square peg and forcing it into a round hole. It creates friction; it is
a poor fit; it both distorts marriage and it creates significant application
problems for same-sex couples.
Civil union laws also may create major religious liberty issues.
Individuals with strong moral, religious and conscience objections to
108 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2.
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facilitating same-sex marriage-equivalent civil unions may be harmed.
Such problems have led to threats of firing, resignations, lawsuits and
major issues in other states that have legalized same-sex civil unions and
same-sex marriage.1 09
A civil union bill that was tailored specifically and drafted carefully to
accommodate the qualities and characteristics of same-sex unions would be
intriguing, appealing and well worth considering. 110 Sadly, none of the
civil union laws enacted in the American states with civil unions is
carefully tailored to same-sex couple relationships. However, that
possibility remains alive, and political limits may constrain both those who
favor same-sex marriage and those who oppose it to seriously consider and
begin to undertake the task of drafting thoughtfully customized civil union
legislation crafted for the particular situation, characteristics and
expectations of same-sex couples, and not just copying wholesale marriage
laws, benefits and regulations.
III. A RESPONSE TO THE EQUAL BENEFITS CLAIM: DISTINGUISHING TRUE
MARRIAGE INCIDENTS FROM GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATIVE
CONVENIENCE BENEFITS
Marriage is not just a public status relationship but it also is a legal
classification term, used in literally hundreds of other laws, judicial
doctrines, and government programs as the basis for extending or denying
rights, privileges, duties, and obligations. These are often called marriage
benefits (even though they often are or include legal burdens, duties and
obligations, not benefits), and they exist in almost all areas of the law. 111
109 See generally Robin Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government
Employee Exemptions, 5 Nw. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 318 (2010); Lynn D. Wardle, Marriage and Religious
Liberty: Comparative Law Problems and Conflict ofLaws Solutions, 12 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 315 (2010);
Robin Fretwell Wilson, Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty: Life After Prop 8, 14 NEXUS: CHAP.
J.L. & POL'Y 101 (2009); Marc D. Stem, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 1, 1-57 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R.
Picarello, Jr., & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008); see also, Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Matter of
Conviction: Moral Clashes over Same-Sex Adoption, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 475 (2008).
110 See supra note 23.
111 For example, marriage is a term of classification of benefits in torts (interspousal immunity),
evidence (interspouse testimonial privileges), contracts (capacity to contract and limitations on
interspousal contracts), welfare law (eligibility for public assistance), insurance law (who is entitled to
certain benefits), immigration law (who is entitled to certain preferred status for immigration visas),
criminal law (certain crimes and defenses are defined in terms of marital relations), constitutional law
(certain fundamental rights are defined in terms of marriage), employment law (nepotism rules), wills
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When used to define or regulate marriage benefits, the term "marriage" (or
"husband," "wife," "spouse," "married persons," etc.) usually includes all
persons who have marriage status, and it also may include some other
persons who do not have legal marital status, but to whom lawmakers
wanted to extend the particular marriage benefit.
Marriage benefits are of two types: Some legal benefits are extended to
marriages and spouses because the legal benefits directly relate to the
unique relationship of husband and wife, or the unique qualities of such
marital relationships, or to the special contributions marriages make to (or
unique burdens they impose on) society. These may be called marriage
status benefits. In most cases it would be unjustified, and possibly
counterproductive, to extend those marital status benefits to non-marital
relations, which do not make the same contributions to society or which do
not function the same for the advantage or burden of society regarding the
state interest associated with the benefit.
For instance, one of the oldest presumptions in law is the presumption
that a husband is father of a child born to his wife. This presumption is the
reason that married men do not have to submit to DNA blood tests to
establish that they really are the father of each of the children their wives
have delivered, and this presumption is the reason that married women do
not have to resort to DNA blood testing to establish that their husbands
have the legal obligation to support the children born during marriage. The
law can rely on this presumption because of two factors that, combined,
distinguish marriages from other relations: procreative intercourse and a
comparatively high degree of sexual fidelity. 112 For example, the latter
factor distinguishes marriages from non-marital cohabitation including
same-sex unions. The presumption of actual biological paternity simply
could not be applied to unmarried cohabiting couples with as much
credibility as it can be applied to married couples. Generally, an unmarried
woman must resort to blood testing to ascertain reliably that a particular
man really is the biological father of her child and should be obligated to
pay child support. Likewise, the first factor distinguishes marriages from
same-sex partnerships because same-sex couples cannot engage (together)
in procreative sexual relations. Thus, application of the marriage partner
presumption to a same-sex partnership would not produce a reliable
and estates (dower, curtesy, spousal shares), tax law (exemptions and deductions), pension law
(nonemployees entitled to pension benefits), and most other areas of law.
112 See Lynn D. Wardle, The Morality of Marriage and the Transformative Power ofInclusion, in
WHAT'S THE HARM? 220-25 (Lynn Wardle ed., University Press of America 2008).
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indication of who is the biological father of the child.
The more closely a benefit is linked with marital status, the more
narrowly the scope of beneficiaries is defined. Essential marriage status
benefits or incidents generally relate to the rights of marital cohabitation
and consortium, the reciprocal financial relations of spouses (mutual
support and acquisition of some interest in the property acquired by the
other), and the co-equal rights of parenthood regarding the children of the
marriage.
The other category of marriage benefits is benefits in which marriage or
marital relationship is simply used as a convenient administrative category,
not because the particular benefit is designed to protect or support families
or because marriage is specially linked to the particular benefit. These can
be called marriage convenience benefits. These benefits reasonably might
be extended to persons in other relationships by substituting functional
criteria for the marriage benefit definition or qualification. The hospital
screening rule for visiting patients in intensive care is one good example.
These benefits might be extended to some non-marital relationships
without detracting from the institution of marriage or diluting the purpose
of the classification. Wrongful death benefits and worker's compensation
benefits are two other possible examples where the core concern of the law
is protecting dependents. The law could just as well (perhaps better)
carefully classify or define eligibility for the benefit using some other
criterion than the convenient catchall of "marriage."
Distinguishing marital status benefits from marital convenience benefits,
however, may not be a short or simple task. Marriage is used as a legal
basis for extension of benefits, burdens, privileges, and obligations in
literally thousands of statutory programs in both state and federal law. For
example, in 2004 the General Accounting Office reported that 1,138
federal statutes use one or more of the above-indicated marital status
terms. 113 (That count did not include the use of those terms in the Code of
Federal Regulations and other federal administrative rules and regulations,
which would significantly multiply the number of instances of marital
status terms.) Similarly, in each state, terms like marriage, and spouse are
113 Defense of Marriage Act: Update to Prior Report, GAO report, GAO-04-353R in response to
inquiry from Senator Bill Frist, Jan. 23, 2004, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf,
see also Joshua K. Baker, 1000 Benefits of Marrriage? An Analysis of the 1997 GAO Report, IMAPP
PUB. POL'Y BRIEF (May 26, 2004), at I, available at
http://www.marriagedebate.com/pdf/iMAPP.GAO.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2006) (citing GAO/OGC-
97-16 (Jan. 31, 1997), Letter from GAO Associate General Counsel Barry Bedrick to the Hon. Henry
Hyde, dated January 31, 1997, and GAO-04-353R, Defense of Marriage Act (January 23, 2004), letter
from GAO Associate General Counsel Dayna K. Shah to the Hon. Bill Frist, dated Jan. 23, 2004).
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used in hundreds of state laws (Hawaii counted over 300 laws; Washington
state over 400; a national lesbian organization says 500 in the average
state) covering everything from contracts to torts, wills to medical
treatment, property to taxes, and parenting to alimony.114 So the number of
benefits linked to marriage is huge. Moreover, the task of classification of
benefits as truly marital or merely a marriage classification of convenience
is complicated by the fact that some marriage benefits overlap both
categories. Separating these benefits is a task that must be undertaken by
persons seeking to have marriage benefits extended to non-marital
relationships, because marriage status benefits (designed to support a
unique facet of marriage or recognize a unique contribution made to society
exclusively by marriage relations) are unique to marriage and should not be
extended to non-marital relations, while marriage convenience benefits
might reasonably be extended to some non-marital relationships.
Thus, legal marriage includes marital status, marriage status benefits,
and marriage classification benefits. The status of marriage itself is a
highly preferred, very positive, very desirable status and that status itself is
the main benefit that some same-sex marriage advocates seek. They seek
the dignity, the social preference, and the social endorsement that the status
of legal marriage entails. Laws regulating the definition and creation of
marriage control the core of marital status. They want to revise laws
defining marriage and regulating the creation of marriage to include same-
sex relations. Other same-sex marriage advocates primarily seek the
marital status benefits that are often linked with valuable economic rights.
Others simply want marriage classification benefits, not wishing to equate
same-sex relations with marital relations for purposes of status or unique
marital status benefits. Many advocates of leveling marriage, such as
Professor Polikoff,s15 want equal marital benefits (perhaps equal status but
clearly equal benefits, including presumably both marital status benefits
and marriage convenience benefits) for all non-marital couples, not just
114 See Report of the Commission on Sexual Orientation and the Law in Hawaii (Dec. 8, 1995)
(the terms marriage, husband, wife, spouse, and family are used extensively in a wide variety of statutes
and programs in state law in Hawaii); id. at 105-26, App. B (listing over 300 Hawaiian statutory
provisions containing references to marriage, husband, wife, spouse, and similar familial terms); Legal
Marriage Alliance of Washington [State] RCW Project 2004, available at
http://lmaw.org/rcw project.htm (reporting 423 state statutes which confer benefits or obligations based
on marital status); see generally, Karen M. Doering, 1,500 Reasons Why We Need Marriage Equality,
NAT'L CENTER FOR LEsBIAN RTS. (Jan. 2004), available at
http://cdml5025.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p266301coll9/id/49 (asserting that each
state "provides approximately 500" rights, privileges, or obligations to married spouses).
115 See POLIKOFF, supra note 3, atpassim.
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same-sex couples.
Undeniably, many relationships that are not marriages make some
contributions that are valuable for particular social purposes. (Even
relationships that are believed to be harmful to society and to individuals in
some ways may be positive in other ways.) In some circumstances it may
be reasonable for the law to recognize those positive contributions and
extend certain legal benefits to such non-marital relations if it can do so
without undermining the institution of marriage, if the benefits outweigh
the harms, and if doing so will not give official encouragement to the
gullible to enter into high-risk relationships. For example, when someone
is sick in intensive care in a public hospital, some hospitals limit visitors to
spouses and immediate family. If the patient is unmarried but has a
roommate he has been living with for some time, even though they are not
married and not biological family, that person may be as important a source
of personal support during hospitalization and recovery as a spouse or
family member might be. So it would seem to be reasonable to support a
law or policy protecting the right of long-term live-in companions to
visitation in hospitals whether the companionship is same-sex or
heterosexual, married or non-marital. There are other similar benefits that
are related to policies not unique to marriage that also logically could be
extended to non-marital couples without any harm to marriage. However,
true marital status benefits should not be extended to non-marital relations
that simply claim to be the functional equivalents of marriages. Nor should
marital status itself be extended to such relationships.
Functional criteria have been suggested in lieu of "marriage" as the basis
for awarding marital benefits, such as "dependence" as a substitute for
eligibility for marital legal benefits. But mere dependence is too facile a
test because dependence may be conditional or temporary in its
commitment. It is long-term, committed dependence or interdependence
that matters-not temporary, or short-term dependence.
Some opponents of extending any marital benefits, even marriage
convenience benefits, to non-marital couples are opposed because it might
be the first step on a slippery slope to equalizing all non-marital
relationships with marriage, which would functionally destroy the legal
institution of marriage. The slippery slope argument is a serious concern
for those who are willing to consider the extension of some customized and
specifically tailored rights or selected appropriate benefits for alternative
relationships. The concern is that offering a package of benefits that meet
the needs and qualities of a specific relationship in year one will simply
open the door and increase the pressure for the extension of all of the rights
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and benefits of marriage in year two or in year three. For persons who are
interested in the law conveying an accurate message and avoiding the false
advertising of portraying as equivalent to marriage non-marital
relationships that are quite different, more risky, and less healthy in
significant respects, this "slippery slope" concern is a very serious matter.
But the short answer to the slippery slope argument is that changes in the
law, such as extending some marriage convenience benefits to non-marital
couples, have no momentum of their own. The public forces that set the
thing in motion must keep pushing for the downhill slide to proceed. In our
democratic system, the same forces that cause a modest change in law to be
adopted can also prevent the adoption of a more radical change in the
future.
Thus, the marriage dividing line between benefits enjoyed by married
persons and persons in non-marital relationships need not be rigidly applied
to marriage "convenience" benefits. The form of marriage ought not to
always make a rebuttable presumption when it comes to marriage
convenience benefits, but it should in many instances create only a
rebuttable presumption as to qualification for many legal benefits,
privileges, and responsibilities. A rebuttable presumption for marriage
convenience benefits is necessary because of the overuse of marriage as a
classification, extending it beyond the need to protect marriage and using it
as a matter of mere administrative convenience. 116
Dual-gender marriages are unique and uniquely beneficial to the parties,
to children, and to society. Just as men and women are profoundly,
beautifully, essentially different from each other in ways that are
complementary, so also the integration of male and female into a union
(called marriage) creates a union that is equally distinctive, unique, and
uniquely beneficial to society and to the individual members of society.
We need not ignore such basic realities in order to accommodate political
movements when the consequences of doing so will harm the core and
fundamental institution of society.
116 The author opposed the proposed interpretation of Utah's Amendment 3 prohibiting same-sex
marriage or giving the "same or substantially equivalent" legal benefits to other relations. See
POLIKOFF, supra note 3, at 152-56. Amendment 3 only applies to giving substantially equivalent
benefit schemes or relationships, not to extension of particular benefits to same-sex couples and to
alternative families.
2012] 697
JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGI7S & ECONOMCDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 26:3
CONCLUSION: PROTECTION OF DUAL-GENDER MARRIAGE BENEFITS
FAMILIES, CHILDREN, AND SOCIETY
Marriage matters because marriage is the foundation of strong and
healthy families and families are the infrastructure of society. Marriage is
not just another source of social bonding and generation of civic virtue like
many other social institutions (such as schools, employers, law, churches,
private associations, etc.). Rather, as the Supreme Court noted, marriage
"giv[es] character to our whole civil polity.""17 Marriage "is the foundation
of the family and of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress."118
It is not merely coincidental that the movement in the United States for
marriage-like recognition of non-marital relationships, including for same-
sex marriage, erupted a generation after the legalization of unilateral no-
fault divorce in America when the rate of divorce and number of divorces
increased dramatically, and the number of children whose childhood lives
were disrupted by divorce increased proportionally. Family structure
matters, and the transition of their families from intact marital families to
divorced families had powerful effects on their lives.
The children of that first generation of children of no-fault divorce are
now adult. Approximately thirty million children in America have
experienced the divorce of their parents in the last three decades. Divorce
is extremely painful for children and very difficult for them to understand.
Children often blame themselves for their parents' divorce, and before they
can understand the real causes of their parents' breakup, intense feelings
sear their souls and leave perceptions that are hard to change by reason
alone. Many children of divorce are, as a practical matter, removed
physically or emotionally from or feel abandoned by their noncustodial
fathers/mothers, and sometimes their overstressed custodial single
fathers/mothers. Many other children of baby-boomer parents have
suffered from other forms of dysfunctional, unstable, high-conflict family
life.
Many of those children of the first generation of liberal (no-fault)
divorce and socially accepted childbearing out of wedlock are now of
marriage age. The failure of traditional conjugal marriage may be
associated with such painful memories that some of the children of this
117 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 213 (1888).
118 Id. at 211 (emphasis added). Thus, marriage "is an institution, in the maintenance of which in
its purity the public is deeply interested . . . ."
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generation are determined to find better alternatives. Non-marital
cohabitation, same-sex unions and other alternative forms of adult intimate
relationship have become popular alternatives to marriage. One symbolic
message of non-marital intimate relationships (including same-sex
relations) is the rejection of the family form that caused them such pain,
and a determination to prove that other relationships can be at least as good
as or better than the family relationships they remember with such pain.
Some seek to revise the law to convey this message of disappointment,
rejection, and pain.
Such persons deserve our compassion, our sympathy, our respect, our
understanding, and our assistance, but the cause to treat non-marital
relationships in law the same as marriage does not deserve our support.
The law reforms they propose are unjust. If they succeed, they will only
extend and exacerbate the tragedy of failed and dysfunctional family life to
many others, and the painful, expensive costs of it to the next generation.
When marriage is weakened, families fail, and when families fail, the
rest of society suffers. As goes the family, so goes the nation or society.
No nation can be stronger or more secure than its families. No society can
be more successful as a society than its families. "[Slociety is a chain
and ... each family constitutes one of the links that together make up the
chain. If the links are not individually strong-if marriages are not holding
together-then the very foundations of the state itself are threatened."119
Thus, it is of great importance that not only in our laws, but also throughout
our culture, we reestablish the importance and ideal of good, healthy,
happy conjugal marriages and marital families. We must protect marriage
and family against the rising tide of cultural and proposed legal influences
that demean, devalue, undermine and threaten the institution of marriage,
or marital families. We must, therefore, reject the claims to 'level'
marriage by including other relationships such as same-sex relationships,
and by extending all benefits, especially marital benefits, to non-marital
couples.
119 JUDY PAREJKO, STOLEN Vows, THE ILLUSION OF NO-FAULT DIVORCE AND THE RISE OF THE
AMERICAN DIVORCE INDUSTRY 25 (InstantPublisher 2002).
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Appendix I. The Legal Status of Same-Sex Marriage in the USA and
Globallyl20
Legal Status - 1 October 2012
A. Same-Sex Marriage in the USA (50 states + DC):
1. Same-Sex Marriage Recognized in Six (6) USA States (+ DC):
Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, New
York (plus the District of Columbia)
2. Same-Sex Marriage Prohibited by State Constitutional
Amendment in Thirty-one (31) States:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
120 See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Who Decides? The Federal Architecture of DOMA and
Comparative Marriage Recognition, 41 CAL. W. L. REv. 1, at App. (2010) (citations for rulings and
laws).
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B. Legal Allowance of Same-Sex Marriage Globally (of 193 Nations /
UN):
1. Same-Sex Marriage Permitted in Ten (10)* Nations (5%):
Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. (*South Africa allows same-sex
civil unions which legally may be called and contracted as "marriages.")
2. Constitutional Rejection of Same-Sex Marriage Globally in 47
nations (24%):
A) Forty-seven (47)) of 193 Sovereign Nations (24%) Have
Constitutional Provisions Explicitly or Implicitly Defining Marriage as
Union of Man and Woman.
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cambodia, China, Columbia, Cuba, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Honduras, Hungary, Japan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Namibia,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Serbia,
Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Spain,# Suriname, Swaziland,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Vietnam.
B) One hundred eighty-three (183) Nations Do Not Allow Same-sex
Marriage. (All except those listed in App. I.B.1.)
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Appendix 1I. The Legal Status of Same-Sex Civil Unions in the USA
and Globallyl2'
Legal Status - 1 October 2011
A. Same-Sex Civil Unions in the USA (SO states + DC):
1. Same-Sex Unions Equivalent to Marriage Recognized in Ten (10)
US States:
California, Delaware, Illinois, Hawaii, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington (+ District of
Columbia)
2. Same-Sex Unions Registry & Specific, Limited Benefits in Three
(3) US Jurisdictions] 22
Colorado, Maine, and Wisconsin (plus some that allow same-sex civil
unions or marriages).
3. Same-Sex Civil Unions Equivalent to Marriage Recognition
Prohibited by State Constitutional Amendment in Twenty (20) USA
States (40%):
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
121 See generally id.
122 This list only includes general relationship recognition laws that provide some couple benefits;
specific narrow particular benefits (such as state employee benefits for same-sex partners) are not
included.
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B. Legal Allowance of Same-Sex Civil Unions Globally (of 193
Nations / UN):
1. Same-Sex Unions Equivalent to Marriage Allowed in At Least
Seventeen (17) Other Nations (plus some that also permit same-sex
marriage):
Andorra, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Liechenstein, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa,
Switzerland, UK, and Uruguay,.
2. Same-Sex Unions Registry & Limited Benefits Provided in At
Least Six (6) Other Nations:
Columbia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Hungary, and Israel..
3. One hundred sixty (160) Nations Do Not Allow Any Same-sex
Marriage-Like Unions. 123
123 This represents the 193 sovereign nations recognized by the United Nations minus the ten that
allow same-sex marriage, seventeen that have civil unions, and six that give some limited recognition
and benefits.
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